Abstract This paper analyzes the role of verification of product availability in the context of competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs). PMGs involve a retailer matching any lower price offered by competition for an identical item. Until now, researchers focused on the scenario where customers can receive the lower price with a simple proof (e.g., weekly flyers). However, in reality, retailers reserve the right to verify the availability at the competitor location; if the product is not available there, then the price-match request might be declined. We develop a price competition model to investigate the effects of verification of availability on price decisions and profit levels of competing retailers. In our model, demand is driven by the availability levels of retailers as well as the price-search cost and store-switching cost incurred by customers. Price-search cost leads to two customer segments: uninformed ones who have no knowledge about prices, and informed ones who are knowledgeable about prices. On the other hand, store-switching cost determines how many Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article
to claim it. Existing studies in economics and marketing literature assume that customers are granted the price match if they just prove the existence of a lower price elsewhere. In reality, however, retailers reserve the right to verify the availability of the item at the competing store before matching the price. For instance, Sears Canada explicitly states: "We reserve the right to verify that the competitor is an authorized dealer located in Canada, that the advertisement is correct, and that the merchandise is identical, and is in-stock at the competitor's local store." PMGs offered by other companies also come with similar clauses.
One possible rationale behind the verification of availability is that it works as a protection mechanism against competitors practicing bait and switch or loss leader pricing policies. Under such policies, retailers announce low prices to draw customers to the store, but deliberately stock low for that particular product; this reduces the penalty of low profit margins, but higher in-store traffic improves the sales of other products (Hess and Gerstner 1987; Gerstner and Hess 1990) . By verifying the availability, the retailer curtails sales with low profit margins and sacrifices its profit margin only if the customer has a credible alternative to purchase at a lower price. 3 However, by declining pricematch requests, retailers are risking potential revenue from customers who are already in the store but are unwilling to pay more than competitor's (lower) price. This leads to an immediate question; is verifying the availability and declining the low price request of customers (if the product is not available at the competitor) always the optimal strategy? If not, under what conditions are retailers better of by doing so?
The motivation for this study stems from the need to analyze the reasons for and the effects of availability verification in the context of PMGs. Product availability, or lack thereof, accentuates the effects of two other factors (in addition to verification) that are critical to the implementation of PMG policies. These, as we describe below, are the price-search cost and store switching cost.
In order to request a price match, customers need to be informed about the PMG offers. PMGs are normally store-wide policies. Therefore, it is relatively easy to remember whether or not a certain store is offering PMGs (Moorthy and Zhang 2006) . However, customers have to put some effort in obtaining and comparing the actual prices of competing stores, i.e., have to incur price-search cost (Urbany et al. 1996) . Consequently, the size of the customer segment informed about prices depends on the price-search cost associated with the product category. A low price-search cost will result in a lot of customers requesting price match when applicable.
Another issue introduced by availability is customer-switching behavior. Customers may visit alternative location(s) if they are seeking a lower price or if the product is not available at their preferred retailers. The switching behavior depends on store-switching costs-costs associated with the process of switching from one retailer to another (Burnham et al. 2003) . Unlike the price-search cost, store-switching cost relates to customer behavior after the store visit. Still, it plays a significant role in PMGs since switching customers become knowledgable about prices and are, thus, capable of requesting a price match.
PMGs constitute an important part of retailers' marketing strategies, especially given that "consumers are more price sensitive than in the past, and more consumers are price sensitive than in the past" (Kalish 2004 ). However, as noted above, Sears verifies the availability of the product as a prerequisite for matching the price. This is not an isolated example; the value that retailers attach to availability is borne out by the fact that 100% of the top 20 consumer electronics retailers offering PMGs stipulate availability at the competing retailer as a prerequisite for matching the price. In this context, it is important to understand the reasons as to why and when retail firms should verify the availability as a price-matching condition. Motivated by these, we seek answers to the following questions:
• How (and why) does the verification of availability as a price-matching prerequisite affect the pricing strategies of competing retailers? • How does such verification of availability affect the intensity of price competition?
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• Under what conditions are retailers better of by verifying the availability?
• What impact do product availability, store-switching cost and price-search cost have on the intensity of price competition when retailers do, and do not, verify the availability as a PMG condition?
In order to address these questions, we develop a price competition model with two retailers, both offering PMGs and selling an identical product. The product is not always available for purchase due to some operational inefficiency. As a result of the price-search cost, customers in the market are of two types: informed and uninformed. Informed customers search for a lower price prior to their store visits. In contrast, uninformed customers do not search for price information. Two customer segments differ in size and willingnessto-pay. Each customer first visits his or her preferred store. Afterwards, they may switch to a competing store if the price is high (price switchers), or if the product is unavailable (availability switchers). We derive and compare the equilibrium prices and profits when retailers verify the availability as a PMG condition as well as when they accept simple proofs to be sufficient for price matching.
We show that the primary reason as to why retailers verify the availability before matching the price is that it enables them to price discriminate informed customers and availability switchers who can not be discriminated otherwise.
Specifically, if retailers do not consider the availability of the product as a price-match prerequisite, then they can utilize PMGs to discriminate only uninformed customers by offering them the high list price while matching the low price of the competitor for the informed customers and switchers. On the other hand, by verifying the availability they can also discriminate informed customers and switchers. Consequently, the roles of customer switching behavior and the willingness-to-pay of informed and uninformed customer segments in the context of PMGs become evident from our analysis. Our results establish that verification of availability reduces the intensity of price competition and results in lower retail prices (and consequently is desirable from the point of view of consumers) if, and only if, informed customers are willing to pay less than uninformed customers.
From a managerial perspective, our comparative analysis shows that ideal conditions for the verification of availability are crucially linked to three factors: price-search cost, availability levels of the two retailers, and storeswitching cost. In particular, verifying the availability is not a profitable strategy in the absence of switching customers. Retailers are capable of discriminating both informed customers and switchers by verifying the availability. However, discrimination via availability is not aimed at informed customers who are on their first visits, but at customers who switch from competing retail stores. The ideal conditions for the verification of availability, in addition to the low store-switching cost, are medium-high levels of price-search cost and/or retailer asymmetry in terms of product availability-since they create sufficient numbers of switching customers. Our comparative analysis sheds light on the effects that availability, price search cost, and store switching cost have on price and profits, and generates new practical insights. For example, we demonstrate that retail prices decrease with the introduction of price-switching segment and as the price-search cost decreases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature and our contributions. We develop the model in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the case of identical retailers. The managerial insights regarding the ideal conditions for verifying availability are discussed in Section 5. The effects of availability, store-switching cost and price-search cost on retail prices are investigated in Section 6. In Section 7 we generalize our results to the case of non-identical retailers. Section 8 integrates the cost of verifying the availability into the analysis and Section 9 provides our concluding remarks. Note that all proofs are provided in the appendix which is provided as an electronic supplementary material.
Overview of the related work and contributions
Following the seminal work of Salop (1986) , the early works in PMG literature illustrate that, despite seemingly acting as a pro-competitive device, pricematching policies actually lead to tacit collusion and monopolistic pricing policies (Edlin 1997; Hay 1981; Zhang 1995) . It is shown that if retailers are identical and if price search is costless, then customers purchase from the firm offering the lowest price on the market (Corts 1995; Doyle 1988) , which motivates firms to engage in price competition and offer PMGs. When all firms offer PMGs, there is no incentive to undercut the prices of rivals. Reduced competition then results in high prices, indeed monopolistic ones. This tacit collusion outcome remains in effect even in settings when the game between the retailers is a sequential one (Belton 1987) , or when firm locations influence the purchase decisions of customers (Zhang 1995) .
The later work on PMGs questions the robustness of the tacit collusion outcome in presence of customer heterogeneity and retail asymmetry. Introduction of price-search cost suggests that firms utilize PMGs to price discriminate customers based on their price knowledge (Corts 1997; Levy and Gerlowski 1991; Png and Hirshleifer 1987) .
5 Specifically, in a duopoly, one firm offers a high price to maximize profits from uninformed customers, while the competitor firm sets a lower price to attract all customers. It is also shown that if customers differ in their store loyalty, in addition to price-search costs, then PMGs may result in reduced price levels (Chen et al. 2001) . Besides customer heterogeneity, retail asymmetry and hassle cost of requesting a price match can also result in non-monopolistic prices. Arbatskaya et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence of high hassle costs in PMGs, and Hviid and Shaffer (1999) show that if hassle costs of customers are considered, any increase in equilibrium prices due to price matching will be small. Coughlan and Shaffer (2003) consider retail assortment decisions of retailers and prove that if the shelf space is limited, then retailers carry non-overlapping product lines, and the equilibrium prices depend on the degree of substitutability.
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Previous research has established that PMGs can be utilized to price discriminate customers based on their price information. However, because all models related to PMG in the literature assume perfect availability, there is no previous modeling of unavailability switchers or price matching based on availability. Furthermore, price switchers are assumed to abandon their search. Our contribution is to augment the existing literature by introducing product (un)availability, switching customers due to both unavailability and high price, and the verification of availability. From a retailer's perspective, unavailability at a rival can be advantageous, since it brings in extra customers. The policy set by retail managers with respect to the verification of availability determines the price offered to these customers, suggesting that the purchasing behavior of this extra demand stream has to be considered in devising the right pricing strategy. Our aim is to understand why and when should retailers verify availability at a competing store as a pre-requisite for matching the price. For this reason, we do not deal with the strategic decision of whether or not offer PMGs; we assume that the retailers have already decided to do so. 
Model
Consider two retailers, S1 and S2, both selling the same product and both offering price-matching guarantees. We categorize the real-life implementation of PMGs into two policies. Under the first one, the retailer guarantees to match the lower price offered by the competition to any customer demanding a price match; we call this simple price-matching policy, or PM for short. Under the second policy, the retailer verifies the availability of the item at the competitor store, and matches the lower price only if the item is available there; we call this price-matching based on availability, or PMA for short. Retailers simultaneously set prices p i , i = {1, 2}, to maximize profits, given their availability levels and the PMG policy (PM or PMA). We define the availability of a retailer as the probability that a customer will find the item on the shelf any time she or he visits the store. Availability levels for retailers are exogenous parameters denoted by δ i ∈ (0, 1], i = {1, 2}. Essentially, this means that Si has already specified and committed to a desired fill rate 8 (or in-stock percentage) δ i for the product. Since fill-rate decisions typically are made in advance compared to pricing policies, it is reasonable to assume availability levels as given parameters. We also assume that the unit cost of the product is identical for the two retailers and we normalize it to zero. For now, suppose that there is no cost for verifying the availability. In Section 8, we include the cost of verifying the availability in our modeling framework and discuss its implications. In order to highlight the effects of verifying availability, we also assume that both retailers offer the same type of guarantee, either PM or PMA, to the customers.
On the demand side, customers make a store choice based on their retailer preferences and price information that they have. As noted earlier, uninformed and informed customer segments differ on the basis of their information level regarding the retail store characteristics and prices as well as in terms of their sizes and price sensitivities. Uninformed customers have no information about market prices and retail store characteristics, and therefore are indifferent between the two retailers. Informed customers, on the other hand, have perfect information about market prices and retail store character-istics, and therefore have a preferred store. All customers are aware that the retailers are offering PMGs, but have no knowledge of the fill rates.
There are 2α customers in the market and a certain fraction (m) of them are uninformed customers whereas the remaining, 2(1 − m)α customers are informed (0 < m < 1). The fraction m, can be interpreted as a proxy for the price-search cost associated with the product (higher m implies higher pricesearch cost). As a limiting case, if the price search is costless (i.e., m → 0), then everybody will be informed about the prices before visiting the stores. On the other hand, if the price search is very costly (i.e., m → 1), then no-one will have price information before visiting the stores. In our model, a higher pricesearch cost will correspond to a higher percentage of uninformed customers in the market and vice versa.
We allow for a rich dynamic of customer choice and switching behavior. Each customer initially visits her/his first-choice retailer. In the event that the product is unavailable or the price is too high, she/he may visit the competitor retailer and make a choice using the price information from the first store. Switching from one retailer to another may be costly for customers. The storeswitching cost is assumed to be identical for all customers and the same for both retailers. We model it by allowing only a certain fraction of the customers (n ∈ [0, 1]) to switch between retailers. The higher the store-switching cost, the lower the fraction of customers who switch. The limiting cases, n = 1 and n = 0, represents costless store-switching scenario and no store-switching scenario, respectively.
Demand model
In this section, we provide the detailed derivation of the demand/sales and profit functions under PMA policy, for a given pair of retail prices (the profit function under PM policy is provided afterwards). For expository reasons, we present the derivation only for S1; the demand and profit functions can be similarly derived for S2. Figure 1 facilitates the description of the derivation procedure by illustrating the demand and the resulting price for each customer segment.
Demand from uninformed customer segment at S1
Recall that uninformed customers have no information about market prices or store characteristics, but are aware that retailers are offering PMGs. Since both retailers offer PMGs, we assume that the uninformed market segment is initially equally divided between S1 and S2, i.e., mα at each retailer. Upon visiting a particular retailer, these customers observe the price, and decide whether to purchase or not. The demand that they generate is linear in list price. Assuming the price sensitivity of this customer segment to be β U , the initial demand from uninformed customers at S1 is mα − β U p 1 . The remaining customers, β U p 1 , find the product expensive. A certain fraction of
customer segment number of customers in the segment price charged resulting demand
(from S2) them, nβ U p 1 , decide to check S2 in the hope of finding a lower price (price switchers) and the remaining portion leave the market without buying. Recall that the availability of S1 is not perfect; therefore, among the customers who decide to make a purchase at S1, δ 1 (mα − β U p 1 ) of them are successful and
Among those who could not find the product at S1, n(1 − δ 1 )(mα − β U p 1 ) customers switch to S2 in search of the product (unavailability switchers).
Due to the symmetry of the two retailers, there will be nβ U p 2 price switchers and n(1 − δ 2 )(mα − β U p 2 ) unavailability switchers from S2 to S1. As far as the price switchers are concerned, the demand that they create at S1 is a}) . Note that these are customers who found p 2 to be expensive, so they purchase only if p 1 is less than p 2 . Even if S1 sets its price equal to S2, it would not suffice to make these customers buy the product. The unavailability switchers at S1 could not find the item in S2 although they were willing to purchase at price p 2 . Consequently, if p 1 < p 2 , then all of these customers will decide to make a purchase at S1. But, if p 1 > p 2 , then these customers will ask for a price match at S1-they switched from S2 and now are knowledgeable about both prices in the market. If S1 uses PMA policy, none of the unavailability switchers will get a match and will be charged p 1 . In this case, only those who would have purchased at S2 had the price been p 1 will buy at S1;
. Thus, the demand from unavailability switchers under PMA policy will be
Demand from informed customer segment at S1
Informed customers have perfect information about PMGs, market prices, and store characteristics. The two retailers in our model are symmetric except for their availability levels (which are not known to the customers in advance).
Therefore we assume that informed customers are equally shared between them, (1 − m)α at each retailer. Since informed customers have perfect information about the prices, their decision to visit their preferred retailer is based on the minimum price in the market, which we define as the effective price, p e = min{ p 1 , p 2 }. Assuming the price sensitivity of informed customers to be β, the initial demand at each retailer is then ((1 − m)α − βp e ). First, consider informed customers visiting S1 and asking for a price match, if necessary (i.e., when S1 has a higher list price than S2). If S1 uses PMA policy, δ 2 fraction of them will be charged the effective price, and the remaining customers will encounter the list price p 1 since the item is not available at S2. If informed customers are given the list price p 1 , there is no point in switching even if they find it expensive. They know that the item is not available at the competitor store. These customers will either purchase at the list price p 1 , or leave without making a purchase. That is, δ 2 ((1 − m)α − βp e ) customers get the effective price p e ; from the remaining portion, only (1 − δ 2 )((1 − m)α − βp 1 ) customers are willing to pay the list price p 1 .
Although there are no price switchers among the informed customers, there will be n(1 − δ 2 )((1 − m)α − βp e ) unavailability switchers at S1 (from S2) and they will also ask for a price match. Using the same logic as for uninformed customers, we can show that, if PMA policy is applied, then all informed switchers will be charged the list price. Again, only those who would have purchased at S2, if the price there had been p 1 will buy at S1. Thus, the demand from (initial) informed customers under PMA policy will be
Profit functions
Note that only a certain fraction of the total demand, δ 1 to be exact, can be transformed into sales at S1. The profit of S1 under PMA policy can be written as the sum of profits from initial uninformed customers, uninformed price switchers, uninformed availability switchers, initial informed customers, and informed availability switchers:
Consider now the profit of S1 under PM policy. In this case, all pricematch requests are granted because the availability is not verified. Specifically, uninformed availability switchers
, and informed availability switchers (n(1 − δ 2 )((1 − m)α − βp e )) will be charged the effective price. The resulting profit function under PM policy is then:
At this point, it is worthwhile to provide a few technical observations regarding the profit functions which will be helpful in the following sections.
1. For the low-priced retailer, PM and PMA policies are identical since no customer asks for a price match. Furthermore, only the l ow-priced retailer is able to attract uninformed price switchers. 2. Suppose that p 1 > p 2 under PM policy. S1 then charges its list price to initial uninformed segment only. For the remaining customers, its price is effectively set by S2. As a result, S1 considers only the initial uninformed segment while setting its price, and S2 needs to set its optimal price by taking into account all customers. 3. Suppose that p 1 > p 2 under PMA policy. S1 charges its list price to initial uninformed segment and declines price match requests of price switchers, unavailability switchers, and initial informed customers if the item is not available at S2. Therefore, in contrast to PM policy, its price decision is affected by the willingness-to-pay of both uninformed and informed segments.
Equilibrium analysis: the symmetric case
For expositional clarity, we first analyze the case where δ 1 = δ 2 = δ, i.e., the retailers are identical in terms of their availability levels. 9 A standard approach is utilized to establish the equilibrium. We derive the best response function for each player and then seek an intersection of the best response functions. The profit of each retailer is concave in its price decision when p 1 ≥ p 2 and when p 1 ≤ p 2 . However, it is not necessarily concave when two domains are combined; in fact it is bi-modal for some problem parameters. Keeping all other parameters constant, we can show that profit is uni-modal if price-search cost (m) is relatively small and bi-modal if the price-search cost (m) is high. The bi-modal profit function creates a downward discontinuity in the best response function which leads to multiple equilibria. Nevertheless, we are able to characterize the equilibria with respect to the price-search cost. 
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When the price-search cost is relatively small, i.e., m ≤ m pm under PM policy and m ≤ m pm under PMA policy (Fig. 2) , majority of the customers are informed about the list prices. In addition, we are investigating the case where the availability levels are identical. Consequently, there is no incentive for price differentiation among retailers. There is a continuum of equilibrium solutions; at each one of these equilibria, the retailers charge the same price, and there are no price-matching incidences in the market.
11 Each player's profit is increasing in price along the continuum. Thus, equilibrium with the highest price is the best solution (i.e., Pareto dominant). We refer to this solution as the equal-price equilibrium.
As the price-search cost increases, the uninformed segment starts dominating the market. Retailers see the opportunity to increase their profits from the uninformed segment. After a certain threshold value, i.e., m ≥ m pm under PM policy and m ≥ m pma under PMA policy, price differentiation starts. Two possible equilibria exist in this range, we refer to them as the dif ferentiatedprice equilibrium. At each solution, one retailer (high-priced retailer) offers the high price and the competitor (low-priced retailer) offers the low price. Fig. 2 Equilibrium regions for identical retailers, i.e., δ 1 = δ 2 = δ Consider the equilibrium in which S1 is the high-priced retailer. At this equilibrium, initial uninformed customers at S1 make their decisions based on the high price of S1. The remaining customer segments, i.e., informed customers, price switchers, and availability switchers make their decision based on the low price of S2 and ask for a price-match. Under PM policy, S1 matches the lower price of S2 for these segments. In other words, S1 price discriminates initial uninformed customers based on their lack of price information.
12 On the other hand, under PMA policy, S1 declines price-match requests unless the product is available at S2. By doing so, S1 charges its high price not only to initial uninformed customers but also to all availability switchers and some of the initial informed customers. That is, S1 price discriminates customers not only on the basis of their information, but also on the basis of product availability at S2.
Thus, by incorporating imperfect product availability and its verification, we can establish that of fering the PM policy allows retailers to discriminate only uninformed customers, but verifying the availability allows them to discriminate both uninformed and informed customers. Also note that m pma ≤ m pm , i.e., we observe price differentiated equilibrium for a larger set of parameters under PMA policy. Hence, the ability to price discriminate informed customers and switching customers creates an additional incentive for price differentiation.
Note that, as we discussed in our technical observations, under PM policy, the high-priced retailer charges its list price only to initial uninformed customers while accepting the price-match requests of the remaining segments. On the contrary, under PMA policy, the high-priced retailer declines the price match requests of availability switchers, price switchers, and some initial informed customers. Out of these three segments, there will be no sales to the price switchers; these customers already switched from the low-priced retailer because their valuation of the product was less than the effective price. When charged with the list price at the high-priced retailer, these customers will leave the market with no purchase. Consequently, the high-priced retailer adds the initial informed segment and availability switchers-we refer to these customers as refused price matchers-while setting its price. 
Verification of availability
In this section, we first compare the retail prices between the two policies-PM and PMA. We define the intensity of price competition (IPC) as the absolute change in the retail prices-lower retail prices imply higher level of IPC, and vice versa. 13 Based on possible equilibria, we divide the feasible into three areas (Fig. 3) . In Region 1, we compare the equal-price equilibrium of PM and PMA policies. In Region 2, we compare the differentiated-price equilibrium of PMA policy with the equal-price equilibrium of PM policy. Finally, in Region 3, we compare the differentiated-price equilibrium of PM and PMA policies. This comparison generates an interesting insight-verifying the availability may intensify retail competition and (consequently) reduce prices charged to customers. It turns out that the willingness-to-pay of customers plays a major role in shaping the effects of verification of availability on IPC. In this context, denote the maximum willingness-to-pay of uninformed and informed customers as r U ≡ mα β U and r I ≡
(1−m)α β , respectively. Under this notation, r U ≥ r I (r U ≤ r I ) implies that the willingness-to-pay of uninformed customers is higher (lower) than informed customers.
Proposition 2 Verifying the availability increases (decreases) the IPC if, and only if, uninformed customers have more (less) willingness-to-pay than informed customers. i.e., r U ≥ r I (r U ≤ r I ).
The primary difference between the two policies is that the verification of availability allows the high-priced retailer to discriminate refused price matchers. If the retailers verify the availability before matching the price, then their price decisions depend on the willingness-to-pay of uninformed customers and refused price matchers, unlike the simple price matching case where the price is set to maximize profit from uninformed customers. Consequently, if uninformed customers have a higher (lower) willingness-to-pay compared to informed customers, then verifying the availability and including all the customer segments in its price decision results in lower (higher) prices compared to focusing only on the uninformed customer segment. The lowpriced retailer follows the high priced retailer and also charges a lower (higher) price under PMA policy compared to the PM policy if r U ≥ r I (r U ≤ r I ). This establishes that verification of availability may lead to higher or lower retail prices depending on the willingness-to-pay of different customer segments in the market. From an individual informed customer's point of view, verification of availability may lead to the refusal of the price-match request, an undesirable outcome. Informed customers prefer the simple price-matching policy under which they can always obtain the effective price. However, simple price matching leads to higher retail prices if informed customers have less willingness-to-pay compared to uninformed customers, as one might expect in practice. So, indeed the verification of availability can be the desired policy for informed customers because it deflates retail prices when informed customers have less willingness-to-pay compared to uninformed customers.
Next, we identify key market characteristics under which retailers should prefer to verify the availability of the competitors.
Proposition 3 The following are true:
• If there are no switching customers, i.e., n = 0, there is no value to verifying the availability before matching the price, irrespective of the price-search cost and product availability.
• When there are switching customers, i.e., n > 0, there exists a unique pricesearch cost level, m pm− pma such that the high-priced retailer prefers to verify the availability (PMA) for m ≤ m pm− pma , and not to verify the availability (PM) for m ≥ m pm− pma .
Let us first consider the case of n = 0, i.e., no switching customers. The extra profit gained by verifying the availability is depicted in Fig. 4a . When there are no switching customers, the equilibrium regions under both PM and PMA policies become identical. In other words, if n = 0, there is an equal-price equilibrium when r U ≤ r I and a differentiated-price equilibrium when r U ≥ r I , under both price-matching policies. The reason is as follows: when there are no switching customers, retailers have initial uninformed and informed customers only. If the uninformed segment has less willingness-to-pay than the informed segment, there is no incentive for price differentiation; thus the two policies are identical. If the uninformed segment has more willingness-to-pay, then there is an incentive for price differentiation. However, since informed customers have less willingness-to-pay, there is no additional benefit in price discriminating them based on availability.
We now consider the case of n > 0 , i.e., when there are switching customers (Fig. 4b) . Compared to the case of no switching customers, we have regions where there is a differentiated-price equilibrium even though the uniformed customers are willing to pay less than informed customers (Region 2) because switching customers consist of both uninformed and informed customers. In this region, since uninformed customers have less willingness-topay, offering PM policy and price discriminating only uninformed customers is less profitable compared to verifying the availability and price discriminating both uninformed and informed customers. However, as m increases, the size of the informed segment decreases, which eventually decreases the profit gained by price discriminating them. 14 Specifically, when r U = r I , the extra profit gained by verifying the availability is already decreasing and continues to decrease as the fraction of uninformed customers increases. The reason is that the low willingness-to-pay of the informed customers segment decreases the value of verifying the availability. After a certain threshold value, retailers are better off when they do not price discriminate the informed customers.
Summary and implications
Under a differentiated-price equilibrium, the high-priced retailer can discriminate uninformed customers by a simple price-matching guarantee. Verifying the availability enables the high-priced retailer to discriminate all the remaining segments based on the product availability at the competing store. However, verification of availability is beneficial only if there are customers who are switching between the stores (in case of an unavailability). Therefore, markets with strong loyalty programs (which might create high store-switching costs) are not ideal for verifying the availability via PMA policy.
Consumer research literature shows that if the perceived risk of dissatisfaction and the perceived price of the product are both low, then customers reduce their price-search activity (Beatty and Smith 1987; Blodgett et al. 1995) . Low price and product complexity i.e., properties that lead to less perceived risk, are common characteristics for functional products with long life cycles. For this reason, products such as basic apparel and durable consumer goods (e.g., office supplies) are perfect examples whereby retailers can price discriminate customers based on the availability at competing stores. On the contrary, for innovative products, majority of the market is usually informed about prices. Therefore, innovative products fail to result in additional benefits if retailers verify the availability. Yet, we still observe PMA policy in consumer electronics retailers such as Best Buy. What is the underlying reason for observing price-matching based on availability in markets with (relatively) low price-search cost? In Section 7, we show that asymmetric product availability is one possible explanation for observing price-matching based on availability in markets with relatively low price-search cost.
Effects of price switchers, price-search cost and store-switching cost on the intensity of price competition
In this section, we investigate the effects of price switchers, price-search cost, and the store-switching cost on the intensity of price competition. We examine how the IPC change within a particular policy (i.e., PM or PMA) with the purpose of understanding the effects of imperfect availability.
Effect of price switchers
In order to put our results in better perspective, we first investigate the effect of price switchers.
Proposition 4 Under both PM and PMA policy, IPC increases with the introduction of price switchers.
First, consider the case of perfect availability, i.e., δ 1 = δ 2 = 1. Practically, PM and PMA policies become identical since retailers have to grant all price match requests. In addition, there are no unavailability switchers between the stores. But the price switching segment still exists and creates an incentive for retailers to be competitive and set lower prices. This incentive stems from the fact that a retailer can profit from the price switchers by becoming the low-priced retailer. When retailers have imperfect availability, there is still an incentive to be the low-priced retailer and serve the price switchers. As a result, introduction of price switchers increases the intensity of price competition, and results in lower prices at both retailers even under imperfect availability.
Effects of price-search cost
Recall that the price-search cost has a significant role on the structure of the equilibrium. Specifically, relatively lower price-search cost leads to an equalprice equilibrium and relatively higher price search cost leads to differentiatedprice equilibria. However, as we formalize in the following proposition, an increase in the price-search cost decreases the IPC.
Proposition 5 Under both PM and PMA policy, the IPC decreases with the price-search cost.
At the equal-price equilibrium, there is no price matching activity and hence no price discrimination in the market. Retailers set the price considering the willingness-to-pay of each customer segment rather than the size of each segment. As a result, the price-search cost has no effect on retail prices and on the IPC. However, as the price-search cost increases, the size of the uninformed segments increases, motivating the retailers to offer differentiated prices. At a differentiated-price equilibrium, we observe price discrimination. Under PM policy, the high-priced retailer focuses only on the initial uninformed segment while setting its price. Consequently, it increases its price as the uninformed segments gets larger. Under PMA policy, the high-priced retailer integrates refused price matchers to its price decision. An increase in the price search cost decreases the size of the informed segment and increases the size of the uninformed customers within the availability switchers. This again provides an incentive to increase the price. The low-priced retailer, under PM or PMA policy, has no direct incentive to increase price as a result of the price-search cost. However, the increase in the price of the high-priced retailer enables the low-priced retailer also to command a higher price.
Effects of store-switching cost
Retailers may locate their stores closer to their competitors to increase any possible stock-out based substitution. This will decrease the store-switching cost and will have significant effects on the IPC.
Proposition 6 Under PM policy, the IPC decreases with the store-switching cost. Under PMA policy, the IPC decreases with the store-switching cost if the willingness-to-pay of uninformed customers is higher than informed customers.
Under PM policy, a decrease in store-switching cost increases the number of switchers, and as a result, the low-priced retailer, which benefits from the switchers, decreases its price. The high-priced retailer is not affected by the switching customers since it focuses on the initial uninformed segment.
Under PMA policy, as the store-switching cost decreases, there will be more switchers and the high-priced retailer will then give less weight to the initial uninformed segment compared to the refused price matchers. If the uninformed customers have more (less) willingness-to-pay compared to informed customers, i.e., if r U ≥ r I (r U ≤ r I ), then the high-priced retailer will decrease (increase) its price as there are more switchers. 15 The lowpriced retailer, on the other hand, always increases its price with the storeswitching cost. Putting these together, we can conclude that IPC decreases with store-switching cost when r U ≥ r I . When r U ≤ r I , we can show that retailers respond in opposite directions to an increase in store-switching cost; the highpriced retailer decreases its price and the low-priced retailer increases its price, leaving us inconclusive with respect to the IPC.
General case: asymmetric retailers
We now relax the symmetric availability assumption and analyze the asymmetric case, i.e., δ 1 = δ 2 .
16 When retailers differ in availability, the differentiatedprice equilibria are not mirror images of each other; prices are different if the high availability retailer is the high-priced retailer or vice versa. In the following, equilibrium N1 refers to the solution where S1 is the high-priced retailer, and equilibrium N2 refers to the solution where S2 is the high-priced retailer. Furthermore, the equal-price equilibrium now becomes a function of the minimum availability level of the two retailers, and is labeled as N3 if δ 2 ≤ δ 1 and as N4 if δ 2 ≥ δ 1 . For retailers' prices, we use the notation ( p Ni 1 , p Ni 2 ) at equilibrium Ni. The resulting equilibrium prices are given in Table 1 .
In case of multiple equilibria, it is possible that the game fails to reach a solution because each player may choose an action supporting a different equilibrium. Specifically, players' preferred equilibrium may differ between N1 and N2. Applying refinement concepts such as Pareto Dominance and Risk Dominance, it can be shown that the equilibrium where the highavailability retailer is also the high-priced one emerges as dominant solution.
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For instance, when δ 2 ≤ δ 1 and we have a differentiated-price equilibrium, 15 For the low-priced retailer, there are two effects, a direct effect through the store-switching cost and an indirect effect through the price of the high-priced retailer. It can be shown that the direct effect of the store-switching cost dominates the indirect effect and always hikes up the price of the low-priced retailer independent of the willingness-to-pay of the two customer segments. 16 Note that only the main findings and implications of the analysis are presented here; the detailed technical analysis and propositions are provided in the Electronic supplementary material. 17 In order to overcome multiple equilibria, we utilize Pareto Dominance and Risk Dominance. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) introduce risk dominance as the opportunity cost of unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium by each player. They define the Nash product value, which is the product of opportunity cost of each player for unilaterally deviating from an equilibrium (e.g.,
2 )]). Equilibrium point with higher Nash product value is risk dominant. For the special case n = 1 and δ 2 ∈ (0, 1], δ 1 = 1 we can analytically show that N1 is either Pareto dominant or risk dominant. Our numerical investigations support the same results for the general case n ∈ [0, 1] and {δ 1 , δ 2 } ∈ (0, 1]. 
we have N1-the equilibrium where the high-availability retailer has the high price-as the solution of the game. In summary, our analysis reveals that:
• Under both PM and PMA policies, we either have an equal-price equilibrium (when the availability levels of the retailers are similar and the pricesearch cost is relatively low) or a dif ferentiated-price equilibrium (when the availability of the two retailers are significantly different from each other and/or if the price-search cost is at moderate-high levels).
• When there are differentiated-price equilibria, the equilibrium where the high-availability retailer has the high price is the solution of the game.
For a clear depiction of the equilibrium regions, we plot the corresponding threshold values for the price-search cost in feasible (m, δ 2 ) space (Fig. 5) .
Recall that when the retailers are identical, we either have a unique Pareto dominant equal-price equilibrium or two differentiated-price equilibria which are mirror images of each other. In other words, our model predicts an equalprice equilibrium for relatively low price-search cost levels when retailers are identical and in this case, there is no value to the verification of availability. However, under asymmetric availability, we observe differentiated-price equilibrium and verification of availability even at low price-search costs. As seen in Fig. 5 , if retailers differ in terms of their availability levels, then they can achieve a differentiated-price equilibrium by offering PMA policy and improve their profits by discriminating customers based on their information as well as based on the availability of the product. In summary, asymmetric product availability might be a possible explanation to the wide use of PMA policy in consumer electronics retailers such as Best Buy.
Effects of product availability
In the remainder of our analysis, we have the availability level of one retailer higher than its competitor. Let δ H and δ L denote the high and low availability levels, respectively.
Proposition 7
The following are true: Proposition 7 shows that, under PM policy the high-availability retailer can soften the intensity of the price competition by decreasing its product availability. If the high-availability retailer decreases its product availability, it need not change its price level since it is already focused on the uninformed customers. However, the low-availability retailer, enjoying extra price and unavailability switchers, will increase its price.
Under PMA policy, an increase in δ L decreases the demand from switchers at the high-availability retailer forcing it to concentrate on the initial uninformed segment. Therefore, the high-availability retailer will increase its price if the uninformed customer segment has higher (lower) willingness-to-pay than informed customers. In return, the low-availability retailer should increase (decrease) its price as the high-availability retailer increases (decreases) its price.
Product availability has direct effects on profits and the verification of availability. Numerically, we investigate the value of verifying the availability with respect to the availability levels of the two retailers. Figure 6 presents our results and shows that the value of verifying the availability increases with δ H since it allows the high-availability retailer to satisfy more of its demand. On the other hand, an increase in δ L reduces the number of switchers and also forces the high-priced retailer to match the price for more customers, and therefore, decreases the value of verifying the availability. So, the value of 
Cost of verifying the availability
Our analysis has so far assumed that verification of competitor's availability is costless. In this section, we relax the zero-cost assumption, and integrate the cost of verification into our model. Most of the time, the verification takes place online or over the phone and the high-priced retailer incurs a cost by doing so. We assume that there is a unit cost, $c v , for each instance of availability verification. Supposing that S1 is the high-priced retailer, the profit function in this scenario is:
Recall that customers who request price matches are the initial informed customers and unavailability switchers. Demand from informed customers depends on the effective price in the market which is set by the low-priced retailer. Furthermore, the amount of unavailability switchers also depends on the price of the low-priced retailer which they first visited. Thus, the number of price-match requests is determined by the effective price. It is noteworthy We can analytically demonstrate that the introduction of the cost of verification has no effect on the structure of the profit and best response functions. The only effect is that the threshold value for the price-search cost to have a differentiated-price equilibrium, m pma , is now larger compared to the zero-cost case. Numerically, we can investigate the value of verifying the availability with respect to its cost. Figure 7 shows that the additional profit obtained by verifying the availability decreases as c v increases, since the retailer now incurs a cost for discriminating customers based on the availability. This is intuitive highlighting the fact that managers facing high levels of verification cost should be judicious about offering PMA and perhaps focus on discriminating based on the information level only rather than availability.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the effects of imperfect product availability on PMGs. Price competition is modeled via two retailers selling an identical product and offering PMGs. Three aspects of our analytical paradigm set it apart from the literature: i) customers switch due to unavailability; ii) customers switch if they find the price to be expensive; and iii) the price charged to the customers may depend on the availability level (retailers can verify the availability and decline the price-match request if the product is not available at the competitor). The equilibrium analysis of the resulting framework combines two types of customers-uninformed and informed. The pricing game may lead to multiple equilibria. We reduce the alternatives, via Pareto-dominance and Risk-dominance, and select an equilibrium pricing strategy to predict the competitive outcome for all practical parameters. In this context, our objective is to examine the implications of verifying the product availability on pricing decisions of competing retailers. Furthermore, we identify the ideal conditions under which retailers are better of by verifying the availability as a price-matching prerequisite. Finally, we look into the impact of product availability, price-search cost, and store-switching cost on the retail prices.
Our analysis reveals that verifying the availability as a PMG condition, provides the retailer the means to price discriminate informed and switching customers as opposed to uninformed customers only and integrates these customers into the pricing strategies of the retailers. If retailers do not verify the availability (PM policy), then they have to grant all price-match requests. However, they do not have to match the price for those customers who have no information regarding the competitors' price, hence not asking for a pricematch. In other words, retailers are then able to price discriminate only the uninformed customer segment. If retailers consider the availability as a pricematch condition (PMA policy), then they decline requests unless the product is available at the competing store. Consequently, retailers charge their list price not only to uninformed segment but to all customers switching from the competing store and also some of the informed customers.
Our results establish that the verif ication of availability decreases (increases) retail prices if the willingness-to-pay of the uninformed segment is higher (lower) than informed customer segment. When retailers verify the availability, they charge their list prices to informed customers and switching customers as well as uninformed customers. Therefore, verifying the availability and including the informed segments into the price decision lead to lower prices if the informed segment has a lower willingness-to-pay compared to the uninformed segment. Note that, from informed customers' point of view, verification of availability is not desirable since the retailer can decline their price-match request under this policy. However, if informed customers are willing to pay less than uninformed customers, then the verification of availability will lead to lower retail prices and result in higher consumer surplus. Of course, the extra surplus comes at the risk of being denied due to the verification of availability.
One major insight from this study is that the value of verifying the availability heavily depends on three factors: i) the availability of the competitor, ii) price-search cost, and iii) store-switching cost. This signifies to managers the importance of gathering information about their market characteristics (with respect to these dimensions) before setting a price-matching policy and pricing strategy. If the price-search cost is relatively high or if the retailers differ in their availability levels, then we observe differentiated retail prices in the market, which allows retailers to easily price discriminate customers based on information through a simple-price matching policy. Differentiated prices also create an opportunity to price discriminate based on availability through the verification of availability. However, our results establish that the verif ication of availability is prof itable only if there are customers switching between the stores. If the store-switching cost is low, customers will search for the product at the competing store. The high willingness-to-pay of these customers creates the perfect environment for retailers to improve profits by verifying the availability and charging high list price to these customers. On the other hand, if there are no switching customers in the market, then there is no value to the verification of availability. In this sense, we consider industries with functional products as good cases for retail managers to establish price differentiation and discriminate customers based on the availability of the competing stores because of their large number of uniformed customers. On the other hand, industries with innovative products have low store-switching costs but they also present a great opportunity if product availability between retailers are sufficiently different. In summary, ideal conditions for the verification of availability are i) low-medium store-switching cost, ii) mediumhigh price-search cost, and iii) sufficient difference between the availabilities of the retailers.
When it comes to the impact of search costs or product availability, we observe that an increase in price-search cost softens the price competition between the retailers and results in lower prices. We also remark that with the introduction of price switchers, the benefit of serving to switching customers creates an incentive to reduce prices. If retail managers plan to improve their availability levels, then they should also consider the consequences on the intensity of price competition through the switching customer segment. An availability improvement in the high-availability retailer will reduce the size of the switching customer segment, and force the low-availability retailer to be aggressive in its pricing strategy and lower prices. An availability improvement by the low availability retailer, on the other hand, will reduce the importance of switching customers for the high-availability retailer and motivate it to focus on the uninformed customer segment, which will lead to an increase in retail prices if uninformed customers have more willingness-to-pay compared to informed customers. That is, a change in the availability level affects the intensity of the price competition in different ways depending on the willingness-to-pay of the two customer segments. This is the main reason for retail firms to be cautious and keen on collecting information about their customer purchasing behaviors.
As highlighted in the introduction, one possible explanation for retailers to offer PMGs based on availability is to protect themselves against retailers practicing bait and switch or loss leader pricing strategies. As we establish in our analysis, the benefits of verifying the availability are two fold. It decreases the number of price-matching incidences, and it allows the retailer to charge its high list price to switching customers. Therefore, we conclude that verifying the availability is not only a protection policy but also a significant profit enhancing mechanism. Moreover, a reduction in competitors availability due to bait and switch or loss leader pricing strategies actually increases the value of verifying the availability.
